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CABLE TELEVISION RIGHTS OF 
WAY: TECHNOLOGY EXPANDS THE 
CONCEPT OF PUBLIC FORUM 
From 197 4 to 1984 the number of cable television subscribers 
in the United States rose from 8.7 million to 30 million and the 
number of cable systems grew from 3158 to 6200.1 This growth 
has forced courts to evaluate the guidance that the first amend-
ment should provide for cable television policy. The courts haye 
entertained questions ranging from the public's right of access to 
the cable system to the proper standards for regulating broad-
casts over the cable system.2 Recently, in City of Los Angeles v. 
Preferred Communications, Inc., 3 the United States Supreme 
Court considered a cable television company's claim that it had 
a right of access to public rights of way in setting up a cable 
television system. The City of Los Angeles maintained a 
franchising scheme whereby only one company was granted ac-
cess to public rights of way in any one market." The Court rec-
ognized that the cable company's claim implicated the first 
amendment,11 but declined to resolve the question of the applica-
ble first amendment standard to be used in evaluating claims of 
access to public rights of way.6 
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1985 542, 545 (105th ed. 1984) [hereinafter BUREAU OF THE CENSUS]. By 
1990, projections show that there will be 55 million cable television subscribers. Id. Cable 
television permits broadcast of numerous television stations' signals to a receiver at any 
one time. The cable company builds a "head end" facility (a satellite dish or antenna) 
that picks up broadcast signals from various television stations. Speaker & Wirtschafter, 
Cable Television Franchising, in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HAND-
BOOK 131, 149 n.1 (M. Meyer & J. Viera eds.). These signals are then sent to customers 
through cables utilizing public rights of way involving utility poles or underground 
conduits. 
2. E.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978) (challenging 
mandatory access requirements); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (reviewing FCC orders regulating broadcasts over cable systems). 
3. 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
4. Local governments may regulate television franchising. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. III 
1985). Normally, one cable company receives an exclusive franchise for a particular area. 
Other cable companies are effectively denied use of the public rights of way. 
5. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494. 
6. Id. at 495. 
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This Note argues that the public forum analysis is the proper 
standard for evaluating a cable television company's claim of ac-
cess to public rights of way. Part I discusses the constitutional 
basis for this standard. Part II examines the ideological justifica-
tions for the public forum doctrine and argues that public rights 
of way are public forums for cable television purposes. In addi-
tion, it explains the application of the public forum doctrine to 
cable access questions and the doctrine's advantages over other 
standards. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 
To demonstrate that the public forum analysis is the appro-
priate first amendment standard by which to evaluate access 
claims to cable rights of way, it is necessary to explain why cable 
television is a first amendment speaker. Further, a brief history 
of the development of public forum analysis will show that cable 
access claims are an appropriate subject for public forum 
analysis. 
A. Cable Television as a First Amendment Speaker 
Until recently, no court had decided whether a cable com-
pany's claim of access to public rights of way fell within the pro-
tection of the first amendment. To receive this protection, a 
speaker must disseminate ideas and information. 7 The Supreme 
Court stated in City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communica-
tions, Inc. that a cable television company's claim of access to 
cable rights of way implicates the first amendment.8 Cable tele-
vision activities fall within the definition of speech.9 Specifically, 
cable television companies are engaged in the dissemination of 
speech.10 They do so not only by transmitting others' broadcasts 
but also by originating their own programming.11 Cable televi-
7. Id. at 494. 
8. Id. ("We do think that the activities in which respondent allegedly seeks to engage 
plainly implicate First Amendment interests."). 
9. Id. ("Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech and the communi-
cation of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public 
speakers and pamphleteers."). 
10. Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
11. Id. 
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sion companies disseminate entertainment, news, and ideas. 12 
These are the types of activities traditionally protected by the 
first amendment.13 
Cable television activities are speech and government regula-
tion of them raises first amendment concerns. The proper stan-
dard by which to evaluate cable companies' claims of access for 
speech purposes remains to be settled. 
B. The History of the Public Forum Doctrine 
Courts use public forum analysis to evaluate claims of access 
to public property by first amendment speakers. The public fo-
rum doctrine originated in cases evaluating first amendment 
speakers' assertion of access rights to streets and parks. As 
speakers' access claims have grown to include other types of gov-
ernment property, the Supreme Court has consistently applied 
the public forum analysis to such access rights. Presently, cable 
television companies are making similar access claims to public 
rights of way, seeking the protections afforded other first 
amendment speakers who have made public property access 
demands. 
1. Streets and parks- Those seeking access to streets and 
parks presented the first claims of access to public property for 
the purposes of speech. Initially, the Supreme Court was hostile 
to their claims. 
In Davis v. Massachusetts, the Court denied a speaker access 
to a public park for the purpose of delivering a speech.14 Al-
though the speaker claimed first amendment protection, the 
Court decided the case on property law principles.111 The Court 
determined that the local government had the power to restrict 
access to public property in the same way a private owner may 
restrict access to his property.16 First amendment protection 
ended where property law began. 
12. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. Ohio 
1968). 
13. Id.; see also City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 494-
95 (1986). 
14. 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding a conviction under an ordinance that required a 
permit from the mayor before one could give a public address on Boston's public 
grounds). 
15. Id. at 47. 
16. Id. 
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The Court next considered the issue of distributing literature 
on public streets in Lovell v. City of Grif/in. 11 The Court, with-
out raising the property law issue, held that requiring a person 
to get permission from a city official before distributing litera-
ture violated the freedom of the press clause18 of the first 
amendment. 19 For the first time, the Court recognized the im-
portance of access to public property in order to give substance 
to first amendment protections. 
A year later, Justice Roberts articulated the public forum doc-
trine in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization. 20 In 
contrast to Davis, he stated that the first amendment's free 
speech clause protected access to public property for the pur-
poses of speech: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for pur-
poses of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions. Such use of streets 
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of 
the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens. 21 
This right of access was not absolute but "must be exercised 
in subordination to the general comfort and convenience. "22 In 
subsequent cases, the Court continued to recognize streets and 
parks as public forums.23 
2. Other real property access claims- The civil rights 
movement of the 1960's provided courts the opportunity to ex-
tend rights of access to government controlled property beyond 
streets and parks. In Brown v. Louisiana, civil rights protestors 
17. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overturning a conviction for violating a city ordinance ban-
ning the distribution of literature within the city without the written permission of the 
city manager). 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom 
... of the press .... "). 
19. Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451. 
20. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (involving the arrest of union members for violating an ordi-
nance that required persons to obtain permits from the mayor before distributing litera-
ture or holding public meetings). 
21. Id. at 515. 
22. Id. at 516. 
23. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). In these cases, 
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses Cases, the Court recognized parading and distribut-
ing literature as appropriate first amendment activities for streets and parks. 
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claimed access to a public library to protest silently against dis-
criminatory library policies. 2• Although the property involved 
was not traditionally "held in trust for communication,"211 the 
Court recognized the importance of the first amendment right at 
issue. Although reasonable regulations were appropriate, the 
Court acknowledged the protestors' right to protest silently in 
the library. 28 
Despite significant extension of the public forum doctrine, the 
Court returned to the property analysis of Davis u. Massachu-
setts21 in Adderley u. Florida. 28 In Adderley, a group of protes-
tors sought access to jail grounds.29 The Court held that the gov-
ernment, just as a private owner, could restrict access to its 
property.30 
After Adderley, it was unclear what property would or would 
not be a public forum. Adderley, however, was the last case in 
which the Court used property law principles alone to decide ac-
cess claims to government-controlled property. 
3. Quasi-property access claims- More recently the Court 
has evaluated claims of access to other types of public property 
or "quasi-property." It has continued to use the public forum 
analysis. 
A claim of access to a school district's mailing system was at 
issue in Perry Education Association u. Perry Local Educator's 
Association. 31 The Court developed a three-tiered analysis, 
based on the character of the property involved, for evaluating 
claims of access to public property.32 The first category of prop-
erty, exemplified by streets and parks, has traditionally been 
open as a forum for speech. 33 The second category includes 
24. :38:J U.S. 1:31 (1966). 
25. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
26. Brown, 383 U.S. at 142-43. 
27. 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
28. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
29. Id. at 40. 
30. 
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the 
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this 
reason there is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had a constitu-
tional right to stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because 
this "area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only 'rea-
sonable' but also particularly appropriate." 
Id. at 47-48. 
31. 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (evaluating a claim by a rival union that it should have access 
to the school district mailing system, when access had already been granted to the union 
then representing the teachers of the school district). 
32. Id. at 45-46. 
33. Id. at 45. 
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property dedicated to expressive activity-for instance, a munic-
ipal theatre. 34 The government may regulate these two types of 
property through the use of content-neutral, narrowly drawn, 
time, place, and manner restrictions.3~ The third category con-
sists of nonpublic forums that have neither been open to the 
public nor dedicated to expressive activity.36 This category could 
be exemplified by Postal Service letterboxes. The government 
may regulate nonpublic forums in any manner it sees fit, as long 
as the regulation is reasonable and is not merely designed to 
suppress speech based on disagreement with its content. 37 The 
Court found the teachers' mailboxes in Perry to be nonpublic 
forums and held that the restrictions on the access to the school 
mailing system were permissible. 38 
Cornelius u. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund 
presented a recent opportunity for the Court to discuss the pub-
lic forum analysis. 39 The plaintiffs, various political advocacy 
groups, sought access to a federal charity drive conducted in the 
federal workplace.40 Under the Perry three-tiered analysis,41 the 
Court held that the charity drive was a nonpublic forum. 42 Al-
though the plaintiffs claimed access to a fund drive rather than 
to real property, the Court found it appropriate to evaluate the 
claim by using the public forum analysis. 
The history of the public forum doctrine demonstrates that a 
claim of access to government controlled property for purposes 
of speech requires use of the public forum analysis. Although the 
types of property to which speakers have sought access have 
changed, the Court has consistently applied the public forum 
doctrine. Cable television companies are similarly first amend-
ment speakers seeking access to government controlled property, 
i.e., public rights of way. They occupy the same position as those 
speakers to whom the public forum analysis has historically 
been applied. 
The Supreme Court, while not deciding the issue, implied that 
the public forum standard should apply to cable companies' 
34. Id. 
35. Id. ("The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of 
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."). 
36. Id. at 46. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 50-51. 
39. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
40. Id. at 790-93. 
41. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
42. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-05. 
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claims of access to public rights of way."3 Although declining to 
decide the issue of the appropriate standard, the Court referred 
to Cornelius, then the Court's most recent discussion of public 
forum analysis, suggesting that it was thinking in terms of pub-
lic forum analysis. 44 
II. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS AND CABLE TELEVISION COMPANIES 
The history of the public forum doctrine supports the claim 
that the public forum analysis is applicable to access claims to 
public rights of way by cable companies. Nevertheless, such 
rights of way, especially under the present approach, may not 
qualify as public forums. The ideological policy justifications for 
the public forum doctrine suggest that public rights of way 
should be public forums." 11 
A. Ideological Policy Justifications for the Public Forum 
Doctrine as They Relate to Cable Television 
The need for a marketplace of ideas to test their truth pro-
vides one justification for the public forum doctrine."6 Cable 
television provides such a marketplace by transmitting a variety 
of ideas through a single source. This diversity was a goal of 
Congress when it passed the Cable Communications Policy Act 
of 1984."7 Restriction of access to only one company, however, 
43. 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986) (citing public forum cases, including Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc .. 473 U.S. 788 (1985), and Members of the 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)). 
44. Id. at 495. "Of course, the conclusion that respondent's factual allegations impli-
cate protected speech does not end the inquiry. 'Even protected speech is not equally 
permissible in all places and at all times.'" Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799 
(1985)). 
45. One justification for allowing access to public forums is that they serve as the 
poor man's printing press. The Supreme Court has suggested that a forum is necessary 
for the "poorly financed causes of little people.'' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 146 (1943). This justification, however, is not applicable to cable television 
companies. 
46. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
47. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 21, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, 46 
U.S.C. app. §§ 484-487, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 and in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); H.R. 
REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS 
4655, 4656 ("The legislation also contains provisions to assure that cable systems provide 
the widest possible diversity of information services and sources to the public, consistent 
with the First Amendment's goal of a robust marketplace of ideas-an environment of 
'many tongues speaking many voices.' "). 
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reduces the possibility of such a market developing. One com-
pany is likely to present only one set of "ideas." Competition 
among several cable television companies in the same television 
market assures an abundance and variety of differing views and 
opinions. 
Public forums also provide protection against government 
censorship and control of speech.48 Allowing local governments 
to restrict access to one company raises the possibility of the 
government's selecting a particular company because of the con-
tent of its programming. This restriction may result in limiting 
access to differing viewpoints and distorting public discussion.49 
For example, in a community with a high concentration of a par-
ticular religious group, the local governing body may award the 
cable franchise to a company which that group controls resulting 
in censorship by that religious group. A society that places such 
great emphasis on the freedom of expression and that receives so 
much of its information through cable television110 cannot toler-
ate such a possibility. 
The policy justifications for the public forum doctrine demon-
strate that the public forum analysis is the best standard to use 
in evaluating cable access claims. To ensure a market place of 
ideas and prevent government censorship, cable rights of way 
should be held to be a public forum. 
B. Public Forum Analysis as Applied to Cable Television 
The public forum analysis is also the most appropriate legal 
standard for courts to use in evaluating cable companies' access 
claims to public rights of way. Application of the public forum 
analysis suggests that public rights of way are a public forum. 
The justifications given for regulating public rights of way are 
weak and fail to take into account important first amendment 
48. Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return of For-
malism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 339 (1986) ("Foremost among these values is protection 
against government impedance of viewpoints the government itself does not favor, par-
ticularly in the form of content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on expression."). 
49. Note, The First Amendment and Cablevision: Preferred Communications, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 22 TULSA L.J. 229, 256 (1986); see also Preferred Communications, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1409 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 
476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
50. From 1950 to 1983 the number of homes receiving daily newspapers rose from 
53.8 million to 62.6 million. During the same time period, the number of homes receiving 
cable television service rose from .01 million (1952) to 25 million (1983). BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, supra note 1, at 542. 
SUMMER 1987] Cable Television 1301 
concerns. Additionally, the public forum standard offers advan-
tages over other standards that have been used to evaluate 
claims of access to public rights of way. 
1. Public Forum Doctrine- Requiring municipal franchise 
licenses of those seeking access to public rights of way is facially 
content-neutral legislation.111 Therefore, reasonable time, place, 
and manner restrictions are permissible.112 In addition, "[t]he na-
ture of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the 
kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reason-
able.' "113 These restrictions "must be narrowly tailored to fur-
ther the State's legitimate interest."114 The extent to which the 
government's interest will control, given the current categorical 
approach, depends on the category of property into which public 
rights of way fall. 
Property is divided into three categories for the purposes of 
public forum analysis. 1111 These include: (1) traditional public fo-
rums exemplified by streets and parks, (2) property dedicated to 
expressive activities-a limited public forum, and (3) nonpublic 
forums. 
For situations that do not fit the traditional public forum 
analysis, a showing that the forum has been dedicated to a com-
municative purpose satisfies the requirement for a limited public 
forum. Because cable television companies are first amendment 
speakers116 seeking access to property dedicated to use by cable 
companies, the public rights of way are limited public forums. 
Courts that have faced this issue have found that a public forum 
claim was adequately alleged by a showing that the local govern-
ment had dedicated public rights of way for use by cable 
companies. 117 
Because the degree of permissible regulation may change as 
technology advances, and increased expressive activity takes 
place through cable television, these rights of way may fall 
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(0 (Supp. III 1985) (prohibiting content regulation). But see 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(discussing plaintiff's claim that the limitation is content-based because it results in the 
"better" speaker being chosen). 
52. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). 
53. Id. at 116 (quoting Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 
1027, 1042 (1969)). 
54. Id. at 116-17. 
55. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. 
57. See Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 
1396, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1985), a{f'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
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within the first category of public forum property.58 If techno-
logical advances make available a large number of cable trans-
missions in a small space, many companies will be able to use 
the public rights of way at one time. Much of the important 
communication of the day may move from the streets to the 
cable systems. Over time, the public rights of way may become 
the "traditional" public forums. 
Under the Supreme Court's categorical approach to the public 
forum question, whether a forum is public or nonpublic depends 
on the intent of the government as to the property's use and the 
nature of the property at issue.59 Some commentators have ar-
gued that cable access rights of way are nonpublic forums be-
cause local governments' limitation of access to only one com-
pany evidences an intent that public rights of way are not to be 
public forums.60 A more thorough examination of the intent of 
the government is required, however. States set aside public 
rights of way intending to aid development of cable communica-
tion.61 By allowing cable companies to use public rights of way, 
the government evidences an intent to use the property for com-
municative purposes.62 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, by contrast, the plaintiff sought access to a 
charity campaign for the purpose of soliciting funds. The Court 
denied the demand due to the government's legitimate interest 
in avoiding disruption of the workplace.63 Furthermore, in Cor-
nelius, the restriction to access, placed on a particular class of 
speakers, was deemed reasonable in light of the purpose served. 
In the cable area, the only relevant class distinction is between 
those who have access and those who do not. Access restrictions 
58. Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1562 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 
("[I]n determining the degree of constitutionally permissible regulation, we must keep in 
mind that [cable television] technology may change over time; such developments may 
change the degree of permissible regulation."). 
59. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
60. One author found the public forum standard to be the constitutional standard 
applicable to cable companies' claims of access but stated that public rights of way are 
nonpublic forums. Note, Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles: Impact 
of the First Amendment on Access Rights of Cable Television Companies, 35 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 851, 874-81 (1986). Despite the claim that cable rights of way are nonpublic forums, 
the author argues that limitation of access to one company is unreasonable in light of the 
forum's purpose. Id. 
61. Note, Aid or Obstruction? Government Regulation of Cable Television Meets the 
First Amendment-Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 665, 684 (1986). 
62. Id. at 684-85. 
63. 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985). 
SUMMER 1987] Cable Television 1303 
cannot be reasonably based on allowing access only to those with 
access already and disallowing access to those without. 
Use of public rights of way by more than one cable company 
will not prevent other uses of the property. 64 Interference result-
ing from unrestricted access would justify some degree of time, 
place, and manner regulation.611 It would not, however, justify 
defining cable as a nonpublic forum. Holding that public rights 
of way are nonpublic forums does not take into account the vast 
technological advances underway in the field of cable television 
that may reduce interference with other uses of the public rights 
of way. 
2. The categorical and functional approaches to public fo-
rum analysis- A finding of a limited public forum under the 
present three-tiered approach would allow certain time, place, 
and manner restrictions on cable television's access to public 
rights of way.66 This is known as the categorical approach. In the 
past, however, the Supreme Court has often used a more func-
tional approach.67 The functional inquiry is directed toward the 
compatibility of the manner of expression with the type of prop-
erty involved.68 The nature of the property, the activities that 
normally take place there, the method of the communication, 
and the appropriateness of the method of communication for the 
type of property involved are all considered.69 The historical de-
velopment of the public forum cases highlights the difference be-
tween the categorical and functional approaches. 
The present categorical approach, which emphasizes the na-
ture of the property involved, results from the fear that all gov-
ernment property would become a public forum without a bright 
line to distinguish public from nonpublic forums. 7° Finding a 
particular forum to be a public forum results in such a restric-
tion on allowable regulations that the Court may only do so re-
luctantly. In attempting to avoid this possible domino effect, 
however, the Supreme Court reaches results without a fair as-
sessment of the competing interests at stake, including the inter-
64. Note, supra note 61, at 684; see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
65. Note, supra note 61, at 693. 
66. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
67. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
68. Id. at 116 ("Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, 
. . . making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech 
should be perfectly appropriate in a park."). 
69. For an in-depth discussion of the differences between and development of the 
categorical and functional approaches, see Werhan, supra note 48. 
70. Id. at 418-19; see, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 
(1974); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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ests of the speaker, the necessity of access, and the existence of 
more narrow solutions.71 Furthermore, the categorical approach 
ignores important first amendment policies and values by look-
ing only to the character of the property without a full consider-
ation of the effect that a finding of a nonpublic forum would 
have on speech. 72 
The functional approach, however, allows a balancing of the 
interests without the domino effect; not all government property 
will be considered a public forum. 73 At the same time, this ap-
proach more carefully considers the first amendment interests of 
the speaker.7" The Supreme Court will probably continue to use 
the categorical approach in deciding future public forum cases. 
Although the functional approach seems better equipped to han-
dle novel situations, the conflict between the two approaches re-
mains unsettled and unrecognized by the Court. 
Should the Court return to a functional approach, it may find 
other regulation to be appropriate. The functional approach 
would allow a court to find that cable rights of way are public 
forums, while at the same time recognizing the necessity of some 
degree of regulation based on the "uses to which the public 
property is normally put. "711 Also, the functional approach is 
more responsive to the technological changes taking place in the 
cable television field. As changes take place, the functional ap-
proach will include the changes in the assessment of the permis-
sible degree of regulation. Should the Court apply the categori-
cal approach and find that cable rights of way are nonpublic 
forums, the Court will have difficulty changing the degree of per-
missible regulation in light of changed technologies. The func-
tional approach allows a greater degree of freedom as the tech-
nology advances and the need for regulation decreases.76 
3. Justifications for regulating access to public rights of 
way- Franchising authorities have argued that restricting ac-
cess to public rights of way to a single cable television company 
71. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); 
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
72. Werhan, supra note 48, at 418. 
73. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding an antinoise 
ordinance near a school building constitutional). 
74. Werhan, supra note 48, at 424. 
75. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 54 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
76. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
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is a necessary regulation. They have offered several justifications 
for restricted access. 77 
Municipal authorities argue that cable television space is enti-
tled to less constitutional protection because it is a scarce re-
source. 78 Although the broadcast medium is scarce due to the 
limits of the electromagnetic spectrum,79 scarcity, in this sense, 
is not applicable to cable. 8° Cable is scarce in that a limited 
number of cables may be placed in the public rights of way.81 
Franchising authorities maintain that this physical scarcity en-
ables them to restrict access to the public rights of way to a sin-
gle cable television company.82 
Regulation of a public forum must be narrowly drawn to serve 
a significant government interest.83 Restricting access to a single 
cable company is not a narrowly drawn regulation. As the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated: 
We cannot accept the City's contention that, because the 
available space on such facilities is to an undetermined 
extent physically limited, the First Amendment stan-
dards applicable to the regulation of broadcasting permit 
it to restrict access and allow only a single cable provider 
to install and operate a cable television system. 84 
In addition, with technological improvements such as cable com-
panies' ability to transmit their signals through smaller and 
smaller spaces, such as fiber optics, the physical scarcity justifi-
cation remains weak. 
77. For a thorough discussion of the justifications for regulation of cable television in 
general, see Note, Expanding the Scarcity Rationale: The Constitutionality of Public 
Access Requirements in Cable Franchise Agreements, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 305 (1986). 
78. Several courts have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 
476 U.S. 488 (1986); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 
(N.D. Cal. 1984). 
79. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (allowing more restrictive 
regulation of broadcast content because the broadcast frequency was a scarce resource). 
This claim is presently the source of much criticism. E.g., Telecommunications Research 
& Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
80. Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1563. There is an almost infinite number of sta-
tions that can be brought into a home by means of cable. 
81. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404; Century Fed., 579 F. 
Supp. at 1563. 
82. The municipalities involved in both Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403, 
and Century Federal, 579 F. Supp. at 1563, made this argument. 
83. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
84. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir. 
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
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Second, franchising authorities argue that the economic scar-
city of the resource justifies restricting access to rights of way.811 
Essentially, they claim that the operation of cable television re-
sults in a natural monopoly.86 It is not economically feasible, 
they argue, for more than one cable company to do business in 
any one market.87 
This justification is well accepted because the theory of natu-
ral monopolies explains the development of public utilities and 
justifies restricting the operations of these businesses to only one 
company.88 One court has rejected the claim that cable television 
is a natural monopoly. 89 The court stated that numerous cable 
companies operating in one market would not involve the degree 
of public inconvenience that numerous utility companies operat-
ing within one market would entail.90 If this claim is true, then 
the government has no significant interest in restricting access 
to the public rights of way, thus making the regulation unneces-
sary.91 Nor does empirical evidence support the conclusion that 
cable television is a natural monopoly.92 The fact that there is, 
at present, usually only one cable company in each market does 
not provide evidence that cable television is a natural monopoly. 
Local governments limit access to only one company and 
thereby skew the evidence.93 
Another argument for restricting access is that the cost of in-
stalling a cable system outweighs the cost of serving subscribers 
85. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.-2d 1370, 
1378 (10th Cir. 1981); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563-64 
(N.D. Cal. 1984). 
86. The municipalities in both Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1375, and 
Century Federal, 579 F. Supp. at 1563, made this argument. 
87. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1378 ("[C]able broadcasting is a mo-
nopolistic industry because it is not economically viable for more than one cable com-
pany to operate in any given geographic area."). 





Unlike water, gas and electric companies where there is great public inconve-
nience in having numerous concerns serving the same geographical market, 
CATV [cable television] is not a natural monopoly. There is only the inconve-
nience of having another pair of wires, if that, involved in having an additional 
CATV company in a geographical market. 
91. Id. 
92. Lee, Cable Franchising and the First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867, 880-84 
(1983). 
93. Id. at 880-81; see also Note, Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Ange-
les: First Amendment Rights and Cable Television Franchising Procedures, 17 PAC. L.J. 
965, 970 (1986). 
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and only one company can economically operate in a market. 
Again, evidence shows that, although these economic factors are 
present, they are not sufficient ground for the elimination of all 
competition in the cable industry.94 
Even assuming that cable television does operate as a natural 
monopoly, that fact alone is not a sufficient justification for reg-
ulation of an activity protected by the first amendment. 911 The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has stated 
that economic scarcity does not justify regulation of newspapers 
and therefore does not justify regulation of cable television.96 
The final justification for restricting access is that cable dis-
rupts the use of public resources and constitutes a nuisance. 97 
That cable television does involve some degree of disruption is 
undisputed: "[Cable television] operating differs significantly 
from newspaper publishing in that the former entails far more 
disruptive use of the public domain, viz., attaching cables to 
utility poles or digging up streets to bury the cables."98 Such dis-
ruption, however, does not justify restricting access to only one 
company. 
The regulation resulting from inconvenience is distinct from 
restricting access altogether.99 Restricting access to only one 
company is not narrowly tailored to the government interest in-
volved. A narrowly tailored solution would not set access accord-
ing to an arbitrary number. Moreover, technological advances 
may reduce the force of this argument by allowing cable compa-
nies to operate with little or no disruptio·n to the public. 
4. Advantages of the public forum analysis- The public fo-
rum analysis offers many advantages over the analysis provided 
by balancing, prior restraint, and the comparative media analy-
94. See Lee, supra note 92, at 882-83. 
95. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1055 (8th Cir. 1978); Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
96. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46. But see Community Communications Co. v. 
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378 (10th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit has attacked 
the conclusion reached in Community Communications. Preferred Communications, 
Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 
476 U.S. 488 (1986) ("[The analysis) suggests that simply because cable's disruption of 
the public domain gives rise to a need for licensing, it would also justify the monopoly 
the City seeks to create by its auction process."). 
97. See, e.g., Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1405; Century Fed., Inc. v. City 
of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1564 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
98. Century Fed., 579 F. Supp. at 1564. 
99. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406 ("Regulating such use and inconve-
nience, however, is quite different from restricting access, as the City attempts to do 
here."). 
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sis. These other approaches fail to take fully into account the 
first amendment concerns at issue. 
Several courts have used a balancing approach.100 This ap-
proach involves weighing the interests of the cable companies 
against those of the local government. 101 The balancing ap-
proach, however, is not sufficient to protect the first amendment 
rights of cable companies. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that where the first amendment is involved, the claim that a reg-
ulation is rational is not sufficient.102 The public forum analysis 
provides the higher level of scrutiny required. 
A prior restraint analysis is also inadequate to evaluate access 
claims of cable companies. Prior restraint merely prevents local 
governments from limiting access to one company where more 
cable space is available. Although one court has used this type of 
analysis, 103 others have ignored this standard. Prior restraint 
analysis fails to take into account the interests of the govern-
ment in preventing disruption of its resources: the focus is exclu-
sively on the first amendment speaker. Striking down franchis-
ing ordinances under prior restraint analysis is only a temporary 
solution to the problem. Although application of prior restraint 
analysis may prevent enactment of laws that restrict access, this 
will occur only so long as there exists space for cable. Once 
rights of way are full, courts will need to adopt a new method. 
In determining the appropriate first amendment standard, one 
must also consider the nature of the medium of speech utilized. 
"Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First 
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it .... "10" Differ-
100. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1375-80; see also Note, supra note 
61, at 674 n.63. 
101. The balancing approach used by courts has been more narrow than the func-
tional approach discussed herein. The courts have put a heavy emphasis on the scarcity 
and economic arguments without a searching analysis of the first amendment interests at 
stake. Although considering the interest of the cable companies, the courts have failed to 
consider the public's interest in a marketplace of ideas. They have also failed to consider 
technological changes taking place. Essentially, the courts have looked to see if the regu-
lation is rational in light of the government's interest in keeping rights of way free from 
disruption. 
102. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) 
("Where a law is subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of ration-
ality which will sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does 
not have the same controlling force."). 
103. Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 891, 901 
(W.D. Mo. 1985). 
104. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)), 
aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
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ences in media may demand differences in the applicable first 
amendment standard. 1011 These considerations have led some 
courts to utilize a comparative media approach, 106 comparing 
and contrasting cable with broadcasting and newspapers.107 The 
approach focuses on the degree to which three factors-physical 
scarcity, economic scarcity, and disruption of the use of public 
resources-affect each of these media. 108 
The comparative media approach is inadequate for two rea-
sons. Despite the claim that it addresses the unique aspects of 
cable, it fails to do so by not considering cable's dependence 
upon access to public rights of way.109 Although this approach 
may lead to the conclusion that different standards should apply 
to cable, it does not answer the question of the permissible de-
gree of regulation. 110 . 
Public forum analysis ensures that a franchising authority will 
be able to restrict access to one cable company only in rare in-
stances. The government will not be able to use the access regu-
lation to disguise content regulation: 
[T]he means chosen by the City to serve its inter-
ests-allowing only the single company selected through 
the franchise auction process to erect and operate a cable 
system in each region-creates a serious risk that city of-
ficials will discriminate among cable providers on the ba-
sis of the content of, or the views expressed in, their pro-
posed programs. 111 
The public forum analysis allows for the vast technological 
change currently taking place in the cable television field. 112 It is 
the type of analysis best suited to deal with technological 
changes. 
105. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403. "[D]ifferences in the characteris-
tics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to 
them." Id. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)). 
106. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-
28 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally Note, supra note 60. 
107. Note, supra note 60, at 857. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 869. 
110. Id. at 863-65. 
111. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1985), a/f'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
112. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978). "Moreover, 
communications technology is dynamic, capable tomorrow of making today obso-
lete .... 'At the very least, courts should not freeze this necessarily dynamic process 
into a constitutional holding.'" Id. (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic 
Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 132 (1973)). 
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Local governments have generally restricted access to public 
rights of way dedicated to the use of cable operations to one 
cable company. Cable companies have recently begun to chal-
lenge this practice. Although the access issue implicates the first 
amendment, courts have not adopted a single standard for eval-
uating these claims. This Note has proposed that the appropri-
ate analysis for evaluating cable companies' access claims is the 
public forum analysis. Applying this analysis to claims of access 
to public rights of way follows the historical development of the 
public forum doctrine. Application of this analysis also helps to 
ensure that government does not influence the content of cable 
speech. Protection against government censorship is one of the 
most important justifications for the development of the public. 
forum doctrine. Public forum analysis takes into account the le-
gitimate interests of the government in regulating cable access, 
while allowing for the rapid technological changes taking place 
in the field. 
-Lawrence E. Spong 
